Self-organized global control of carbon emissions by Zhao, Zhenyuan et al.
Self-organized global control of carbon emissions
Zhenyuan Zhao1, Dan Fenn2, Pak Ming Hui3 and Neil F. Johnson1
1Physics Department, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33126, U.S.A.
2Oxford Centre for Industrial and Applied Maths, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3PU, U.K.
3Department of Physics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
(Dated: November 6, 2018)
There is much disagreement concerning how best to control global carbon emissions. We explore
quantitatively how different control schemes affect the collective emission dynamics of a population of
emitting entities. We uncover a complex trade-off which arises between average emissions (affecting
the global climate), peak pollution levels (affecting citizens’ everyday health), industrial efficiency
(affecting the nation’s economy), frequency of institutional intervention (affecting governmental
costs), common information (affecting trading behavior) and market volatility (affecting financial
stability). Our findings predict that a self-organized free-market approach at the level of a sector,
state, country or continent, can provide better control than a top-down regulated scheme in terms
of market volatility and monthly pollution peaks.
A CO2 emissions level of ≤ 500 ppm [1] would set
the probability of a potentially catastrophic 5◦C warm-
ing at 3%[1]. At a recent G8 summit, leaders agreed
to ‘strongly consider’ at least halving global emissions
by 2050[2]. However, there is still no national or inter-
national consensus on how these reductions can be sys-
tematically achieved and maintained[3], nor is there any
deep quantitative understanding of the trade-offs which
could arise at the local and global level. Given the re-
cent instabilities in global financial markets and apparent
inevitability of human irrationality[4], it is also unclear
whether a free-market approach can ever be trusted[5].
Here we analyze a simple, yet realistic dynamical
model of a competitive emissions market which allows us
to investigate the simultaneous interplay between myriad
competing real-world factors. Our model is a non-trivial
generalization of the El Farol bar problem[6] which has
attracted much attention among physicists[7, 8, 9]. In
addition to offering the physics community a novel gen-
eralization and application of the El Farol model, we be-
lieve that our work provides the first unified, quantitative
discussion of the underlying trade-offs between average
emissions, instantaneous peak pollution levels, market
stability, efficiency of production, and common informa-
tion. Our model predicts that a completely self-organized
emissions market with collective competition and no top-
down management, can offer distinct advantages over a
managed system in terms of peak emission values. Al-
though helpful with respect to the mean monthly emis-
sion, top-down monthly management can by contrast in-
duce a far bigger volatility and hence aggravate the un-
certainty in emissions.
Figure 1 shows a schematic describing our generic emis-
sions scenario, comprising N emitters (e.g. companies)
who each decide whether to emit or not during a par-
ticular timestep t (e.g. day). All companies are as-
sumed to have the same emission capabilities (i.e., one
unit of carbon each timestep). The system’s (e.g. na-
tional) safe emission level is L over some period ∆t (e.g.
X(T) = aggregated emission 
in month T
{1,0,1}
x(t) = daily emission     
on day t
FIG. 1: (Color) Schematic diagram of the carbon mar-
ket model and the resulting daily time series x(t) for day
t = 1, 2, . . ., together with the aggregated monthly time-series
X(T ) for month T = 1, 2, . . ..
month ∆t = 30), with successive periods (e.g. months)
labelled T = 1, 2, . . .. Hence the average emission cap per
timestep (e.g. day) is L¯ = L/∆t. Depending on the top-
down management infrastructure of interest, the emitters
could equally well be industries within a sector, com-
panies within a state, states within a country, countries
within a continent, or countries or continents within some
global organization – likewise, the relevant timescales t
and T need not be days and months respectively. From
a governmental perspective, the ideal outcome would be
that the total emission each month X(T ) is exactly equal
to L units of carbon pollutants: If X(T ) > L then
too much carbon dioxide is emitted into the atmosphere,
while X(T ) < L means that the nation has wasted some
of its allowed production capacity[3]. Companies are re-
warded in some generic way (e.g. favorable public opin-
ion, or a monetary compensation) for choosing to emit on
low-pollution days (x(t′) ≤ L¯) or abstaining from emit-
ting on high-pollution days (x(t′) > L¯), and receive pun-
ishments otherwise. Each day’s outcome is represented in
terms of its collective emission: 1 if x(t′) ≤ L¯ for a given t′
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2and 0 if x(t′) > L¯. Companies rely on common, publicly
disclosed information when deciding whether or not to
emit at a given timestep. We take this common informa-
tion to be dominated by the previous m days’ outcomes,
a bit-string of length m compromised by 0 or 1, but in
principle it could include other information from gov-
ernment, public or other competitors. The fact that all
participants have access to, and use, the same informa-
tion, can generate correlations between their actions. A
strategy is a specific prediction 0 or 1 (and hence action,
emit or don’t emit) for each of the 2m possible informa-
tion bit-strings, hence there are 22
m
strategies. Compa-
nies randomly select s strategies from the strategy space
with repetitions allowed during the assignment. Each
company uses its best performing strategy at a given
timestep, with an individual strategy’s score updated by
+1 (−1) at a given timestep, if it would have made the
correct (incorrect) decision. The correct decisions are
emitting (not emitting) when the cap is not exceeded
(exceeded), and vice versa for incorrect decisions. Tied
best-performing strategies are broken by random choices.
Our setup therefore incorporates the generic complex sys-
tem features of Arthur’s El Farol problem and Challet
and Zhang’s binary version[6, 7, 8, 9]. Most importantly,
companies do not communicate directly among them-
selves, nor do they need to know the number of competi-
tors around, nor are they managed by some governmen-
tal entity. Instead, by competing to emit, they interact
through the common information that their collective ac-
tions create. There is recent independent evidence that
groups of human do indeed employ such general decision-
based mechanisms as in Fig. 1[10]. More generally, our
model mimics a simple cap-and-trade scenario in which
emitters who decide to emit on a given day immediately
purchase a permit to do so. The less emitters per day,
the lower the demand for permits, and hence the lower
that day’s permit price, and vice versa. Hence the time-
series of emissions x(t) mimics the time-series of permit
prices.
Figure 2 shows that this simple model is capable of
reproducing the highly irregular, non-Gaussian distribu-
tion of the 2009 EU carbon market to date. The model
parameters and their values have a direct and reasonable
interpretation: N = 100 suggests that the actions of ap-
proximately one hundred entities (e.g. large companies)
is moving the market in 2009, and hence visibly impact-
ing the overall emissions; m = 4 suggests that just less
than one week of prior outcomes is considered relevant for
making a decision; s = 6 suggests that individual entities
are using approximately six strategies to make a decision
about whether to buy a permit and hence emit. Choosing
to emit is equivalent to buying a permit and using it on
that day – if less people apply on a given day, the permit
price is low which means that the time-series of the num-
ber of emitters and the price mimic each other. Hence as
a surrogate of the actual daily emissions, we have taken
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0
1x107
2x107
3x107
 
 data
 model
fre
qu
en
cy
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n
deviations from mean (V-<V>)/σ
 
 
 
 
vo
lu
m
e 
(V
)
 trading days in 2009
FIG. 2: (Color) The upper panel is the daily time series of
the first 176 trading days’ total volume in 2009 from ECX
EUA futures contract, in tonnes of CO2 (EU allowances).
The lower panel shows the empirical frequency distribution
of (V − 〈V 〉)/σ), as compared to our model m = 4, averaged
over 100 runs. Our model is a good representation of the
empirical data, but has the added advantage that it eliminates
the extreme peaks observed in the EU market (indicated by
circles in the top panel). This suggests that our unmanaged
free market mechanism would provide tighter control than the
existing EU market.
the daily carbon price to represent the daily demand for
permission to emit, and hence the resulting volume of
emissions. The quantity displayed, (V − 〈V 〉)/σ, is in-
dependent of the number of participants N , for large
N . We note that our model shows a smaller occurrence
of extreme events than the empirical data, suggesting
that our competitive, self-organized setup might provide
better control of large fluctuations than the present EU
scheme which is operating. If the distribution were more
Gaussian-like as in regular financial markets, this would
suggest that the market should contain many noisy spec-
ulators – however, the multi-modal form in Fig. 2 implies
that this is not the case.
Figure 3 compares the predictions of our model for
monthly emissions between an unmanaged (red curve)
and managed (blue curve) system, as a function of the
amount of common information about previous outcomes
(i.e. m). The average daily emissions cap is L¯ = 60. In
the managed system, at the end of month T , the gov-
ernment will reduce or increase the emissions capacity
L(T + 1) for month T + 1 by the amount that the aggre-
gated emissions X(T ) was above or below L(T ). In the
unmanaged system, there is no such external control and
hence L is constant. The overall system performance can
be assessed through the time-series for monthly emissions
X(T ) (Fig. 1): In particular (top to bottom in Fig. 3) the
mean 〈X〉, the maximum max(X) (where max(X) is the
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FIG. 3: (Color) Monthly emissions for our model, for N =
100, s = 6. Top to bottom: the mean monthly emission
〈X〉, the maximum (i.e. peak) monthly emission, the monthly
volatility σ(X), and the governmental cost of compensation to
companies for not emitting. Red: unmanaged system. Blue:
managed system. Green: random result for learning p = L¯/N .
largest monthly emission value during the time-window
of the numerical simulation) over some fixed period (e.g.
a year), and the standard deviation (i.e. volatility σ(X))
about the mean. An interesting comparison system is ob-
tained by considering the ‘random’ case of an unmanaged
system in which companies decide to emit by tossing a
coin each day. In the absence of any learning (i.e. the
system is non-adaptive) every decision is an independent
coin toss and hence the a priori probability to emit would
be p = 0.5. However if the entities are gradually able to
learn from the feedback of the previous experience and
adapt to the ideal ratio L¯/N (at least, at the collective
level) then p = L¯/N yielding the green curves shown in
Fig. 3.
The mean monthly emission 〈X〉 decreases monoton-
ically as m increases for both systems. The monthly
control exerted in the managed system pulls the value
closer to the capacity limit of 1800 than for the unman-
aged system. However, this improved performance due to
top-down management is accompanied by a significantly
higher volatility for m > 6 as well as a significantly higher
peak pollution level. Indeed, the managed system does
worse than both the unmanaged system and the ran-
dom system with learning. This is because the month-
by-month adjustment to L¯ induces a delayed oscillatory
effect which in turn generates significant volatility. A
transition occurs around m ∼ 4 where all the curves seem
to cross the green (i.e. random learning) curve. This m
value coincides with the system’s dynamical de Bruijn
path (which has duration 2.2m [11]) becoming equal to
the finite duration of the emission interval (i.e. 30 days,
hence 2.2m ∼ 30 which yields m ∼ 4). This precedes a
minimum in the volatility around m ∼ 5 for both man-
aged and unmanaged systems, which is smaller than for
random learning. As for the El Farol problem[6, 7, 8, 9],
this unintentional collective cooperation emerges as a re-
sult of cancellation between the actions of crowds of emit-
ters using one strategy, and anticrowds using the exact
opposite strategy. The cost result (bottom panel) re-
flects a simple one-unit payout given to any company
not emitting on a given day. The choice of emitting or
not-emitting becomes essentially cost-neutral to a given
company – however for public relations reasons, and be-
cause they want to stay active in business, each company
still continues to compete. A higher 〈X〉 hence incurs a
lower cost.
Figure 4 shows the model’s daily emission (Fig. 4(a),
crosses) and volatility (Fig. 4(b), crosses) as a function
of the daily emissions cap L¯. The red shaded area in
Figs. 4(a) and (b) is the ‘learning zone’ bounded by the
two analytically obtained limits of no learning (p = 0.5,
the probability that a company is going to emit at a
timestep, horizontal red line) and learning (p = L¯/N ,
red diagonal line in Fig. 4(a) and convex curve in Fig.
4(b)). The standard deviation for daily emissions in the
random case, is given analytically by the usual binomial
form, i.e. [Np(1 − p)] 12 . Using the lower bound value
p = L¯/N yields the convex curve [L¯(1 − L¯/N)] 12 , while
using the upper bound value p = 0.5 yields the hori-
zontal line 0.5N
1
2 = 5. The model’s mean emission val-
ues (crosses) lie within the shaded area in Fig. 4(a) but
are closest to the limit p = L¯/N , thereby demonstrating
that the unmanaged, self-organized market collectively
learns. For intermediate L¯ values (Fig. 4(b)) the corre-
sponding volatility tends to be smaller than the random
value, however it moves above it for very large or small
L¯. For small m values, which corresponds to the crowded
regime of the strategy space, numerical runs can show
significantly large volatilities (green circle).
Figure 4(c) explores the implications of our results
for the derivative emissions markets. If emission mar-
kets follow the path of the mature non-emission finan-
cial markets, it is likely that such derivatives (e.g. op-
tions) markets will become as large, or even larger, than
the primary emissions market itself[9]. In this respect,
our findings serve as a warning of the dangers of sim-
ply applying standard financial theory for such deriva-
tive instruments[9]. Standard option pricing theory uses
4(a)
(c)
(b)
FIG. 4: (Color) Daily emissions for our model with m varying
from 2 to 12 (s = 6). Red shaded region is the analytically
obtained zone of learning (see text). (a) Mean emission. Hor-
izontal boundary line corresponds to no learning, diagonal
boundary line (slope of unity) is for learning. (b) Volatility.
Horizontal boundary line corresponds to no learning, convex
curve is for learning. Green shaded circle shows low m, high
volatility region due to crowding in strategy space. (c) Euro-
pean call option prices for different measurements of volatil-
ity according to the standard derivative pricing theory (i.e.
Black-Scholes equation). Risk-free interest rate r = 0, cur-
rent value x is set to the individual mean divided by 100, and
strike price Xs equals L¯/100. The volatility σ is scaled by
1/
√
100. The time is one day before expiration. Blue curve
uses the results from monthly measurement, while purple one
is from daily measurement. The insert shows the anomalous
scaling of volatility of emissions, from daily to monthly scales.
There are 64 runs for each m. The purple crosses are the
standard deviation calculated by taking the daily volatility
and multiplying by
√
30, which would be exactly equal to the
monthly volatility if the time-series followed a random walk.
the volatility over a given time increment as the input to
the Black-Scholes pricing formula[12]. This assumes that
the market approximates to a random walk and hence
that the monthly volatility over ∆t timesteps is simply
the volatility over one timestep multiplied by
√
∆t. Fig-
ure 4(c) shows not only that this is incorrect (see inset),
but also that the discrepancy depends on the amount of
common information m – and that as a consequence, the
price of a call option (Fig. 4(c)) can be mispriced accord-
ing to whether daily or monthly volatility estimates are
used. This opens up an intriguing but dangerous situa-
tion in the event of any abnormal periods in the market:
Following some external news event (e.g. collapse of an
oil company), it may happen that the number of previous
days’ outcomes that are thought relevant, becomes very
small (i.e. m → 0). As shown, the corresponding mis-
pricing then becomes huge, leading to possible financial
instabilities.
Despite recent skepticism surrounding the stability of
free markets, our analysis predicts that an unmanaged
carbon emissions market can provide significant advan-
tages over a managed one. For a given sector, state, coun-
try or continent, our model helps identify the appropriate
degree of governmental management such that annual
global emissions targets are achieved, while simultane-
ously allowing for individual choice regarding the trade-
off between local social issues as listed in the abstract.
Finally, we have checked that our main conclusions are
reasonably robust to different sets of parameter values.
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